Matthew: While I appreciate your largely balanced and accurate comments relative to the 2010 budget and those items for which it provides funding, they are only partially accurate about C-17, insofar as AF requirements.
As Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC, has stated publicly and often, the data to which the SECDEF, the SECAF and others have referred to as reasons for termination of C-17 production, have been debunked as based on flawed analytics and inapplicable, outdated, conflict assumptions by the GAO and Congress, or do not exist. They can only be referring to the 2005/2006 Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) produced by the Pentagon Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the Strategic airlift section of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR) which echoes MCS conclusions that "180 C-17s augmented by 112 REAMP/RERP C-5s was enough".
In defense of what seems to be a dichotomy of that which is publicly stated and actual airlift requirements, the AF was pretty much hamstrung and stuck with the C-5s, which the service desperately wanted to get rid of, thanks to behind the scenes maneurvering (well, that's the way of the Beltway, right?) resulting in a 2004 Congressional Mandate authored by Sens. Kennedy and Biden that prevented retirement of any models save for those 14 AC that were absolutely beyond repair.
Being part, for nearly a decade, of an industry/government team which included National Security strategist Dr. Sheila R. Ronis, (a valued member of the Project on National Security ReformPNSR.org, tasked with rewriting the 1947 National Security Act), that helped restructure the original CAMAA (Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft) program, the comments of a very upset AF General were relayed to me the day the mandate was implemented: "We keep trying to push these aircraft [C-5s] out the back door, and they [Congress and LMCO] keep pushing them in the front door. From this point on, it's going to be damned difficult to get C-17s at the levels we need them (at least 222, with 300+ quite usable)."
I should also note that Dr. Ronis and I were privileged to work with former SECAF Dr. James Roche who tasked us with crafting what we felt would be a more readily implementable CAMAA strategy in the form of a white paper linked below.
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/ghhsecafroche-the-grand-strategy13-presentation
http://commercial_application_of_military_airlift_aircraft.totallyexplained.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_Application_of_Military_Airlift_Aircraft
The General mentioned above was of course, quite correct; it has been a yearly struggle to keep the C-17 Long Beach line open. And because the existence and continuance of C-17 is so vital to our implementation of a US/NATO-controlled Heavy and Outsized industry utilizing modestly, very modestly, modified Globemasters designated BC-17, we have worked diligently to maintain its production as the following releases from this year, following the April announcement by Dr. Gates of DoD intent to end production, demonstrate:
Current: 10/09
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-internal-dod-analyses-referenced-in-bid-to-kill-boeing-c17-nonexistent
May/October 2009
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC2/global-heavylift-states-c17-production-must-be-maintained-to-seek-faa-bc17-exemption-separate-from-boeingcontinues-pursuit-of-usd184b-capital-raise-to-implement-usnatocontrolled-heavy-and-outsized-air-cargo-industry-based-on-wellproven-airlifter
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-submits-rfp-to-boeing-for-ten-7478f-freighters
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-pushes-120-boeing-c17s-for-20102020-budgets
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-provides-copy-of-publicly-unavailable-dept-of-commerce-boeing-c17-industrial-base-impact-study
http://www.slideshare.net/guestde926c4/global-heavylift-holdingsllc-cites-absolute-need-for-commercial-boeing-c17-bc17based-permanent-air-augmentation-of-us-industrial-base-global-supply-chain-notes-chinas-virtual-control-of-oceanborne-shipping-and-rise-as-naval-power
May 2007 Jonathan Club Presentation
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/speed-news-aerospace-and-defense-conference-an-usnato-controlled-heavylift-industry-utilizing-boeing-bc17-globemaster-iii-commericalmilitary-airlifters
Puzzling Behavior
The arguments presented by C-17 antagonists have at best been puzzling to us and most certainly to Boeing, since we know there is no basis whatsoever for their assertions of "we have enough C-17s and buying more is a waste of money, epitomizes 'pork barrel' spending and is a poster child for the extremes of earmarks."
Nothing is further from the truth, and we openly challenge our colleagues both within government and those who represent the private sector cheering section calling for the demise of this indispensable airlifter, currently flying at over 159% of mission utilization projections, to produce the data to support their arguments. It is not enough to say "planes the AF did not request or need", "unwanted C-17s", or, "The SECAF says they have more than enough to handle even worst case scenarios". No, one must be able to ably support such contentions, and we must not forget the DoD spends 10s of millions to contract Russian/Ukrainian owned An-124s to make up for in-theater strategic airlift shortfalls. So much for "we have enough"...
Short story?THE DATA DO NOT EXIST TO SUPPORT C-17 TERMINATION.
Also, we have to marvel at the lengths certain colleagues in the private sector constituting elements of what we believe to be an "intellectual" assault on C-17, are willing to go in demanding the end of this aircraft. This, in the form of specious, if not fallacious, claims relative to C-17 cost which one think-tank claimed was USD376 million (included per plane development costs; an atypical publicly stated cost representation that goes beyond the disingenuous), another organization, 276 milliion. The AF gets them according to Boeing and the service itself, for 200 million or soon, even less, as Boeing Long Beach administrative and production personnel become more efficient everyday through the process of continuous improvement. Economies of scale will produce costs even further, thereby reinforcing the wisdom of a multi-year buy(2010-2020) for 120+ C-17s.
And then, there are those who make an "apples to oranges" comparison of retrofitted C-5s versus new C-17, citing "USD81 million for the larger capacity (120 ton) Galaxy as opposed to 200 million for the smaller (87 ton) Globemaster III. As recently noted in an Aviation Week piece by Amy Butler, the comparative numbers presented in response to a clearly planted question, taken at face value, would cause any reasonable person to conclude that support of C-17 would justify an immediate psychiatric examination. That is, up until the moment they are gobsmacked by the operational realities of Iraq and especially Afghanistan: C-5s require significant infrastructure, and as a colleague said "There ain't a lot of that in Afghanistan."
Their operation, large targets they are and not likely to be missed by even the most incompetent of attacking enemy fighter pilots, also requires control of the air in the battlespace (ask any driver what ship they'd like to be in, C-5 vs C-17, in a chance encounter with a Mig-35. Some may also remember Tom Clancy's treatment in his book World War III of troop-laden C-5s encountering armed Russian bombers) .
Indeed, C-17, owing to its extraordinary ability to operate on underprepared, even unprepared, runways as long as it's flat or near flat, earth (the proposed C-17B is designed to land in mud or beach sand) in austere in-theater locales makes it the indispensable, life-saving, battle winning, strategic/tactical airlifter it has proven to be. In Air Force tests, it has landed and taken off with 22 tons aboard in distances less than 1350'.
Its amazing performances, whether humanitarian/disaster relief or conflict support missions, caused me to remark in a presentation some years ago, "The only way the DoD could do better relative to a mission capable aircraft is to introduce a 489 knot, 2500 nautical mile range Sikorsky Skycrane with 87 ton capacity. To be sure, comparing C-17 to C-5, An-124 or B-747 is like comparing Fat Albert (the Cosby character) to Michael Jordan."
Most importantly, C-17 is the ideal, if not perfect, airlift platform for addressing the potential of conventional and asymmetric warfare existing concomitantly, along with an observable increase in the frequency of disaster/humanitarian relief scenarios. This reality dictates the ability to rapidly project significant force in a way that acknowledges the comfortable bi-polarity of the Cold War has been replaced by the dangers and unpredictability of a militarily/economically emergent China, a nuclear armed Iran, the traditional uncertainties associated with North Korea's beligerence and terrorist organizations possessed of global reach.
We will state, and will continue state our firm belief that the continuous and intense efforts to kill Boeing C-17 -- we are in full expectation of at least one last effort to remove funding for the additional 10 AC from the 2010 Budget -- are directly the result of a desire by involved parties to retrofit all remaining C-5s and introduce the yet-to-fly Airbus/EADS A400M Turboprop, 37 ton capacity tactical airlifter into USAF inventories... both aspirations requiring the demise of C-17, and perhaps, Boeing itself.
It goes without saying that the loss of the country's last wide body airlifter production line and its product will have critical, long lasting and perhaps unrecoverable negative economic, national security and industrial base/defense industrial base cohesiveness and viability implications; contentions supported in the officially unavailable 2005 Department of Commerce Study "National Security Assessment of the C-17 Globemaster Cargo Aircraft's Economic and Industrial Base Impacts".
http://www.emotionreports.com/downloads/pdfs/GHHDOC_C17_2005.pdf
We strongly recommendation review of this very important document by our, with all due respect, underinformed colleagues who, by their public comments such as "Billions Spent to Save 5000 Long Beach Jobs", have yet to grasp that the defense industrial base and the industrial base are one and the same, symbiotic, inseparable and inextricably linked. They would also do well to take a refresher course in Keynesian economics.
Lastly, we believe that we have addressed the ultimate conversation stopper when it comes to annual funding of new or existing DoD programs, which is "is there money in the budget?". The process is called Transformational Recapitalization" and as articulated by Dr. Ronis in the November/December 2004 issue of Defense AT&L, will forever change the DoD acquisition process by allowing the AF to resell in-fleet aircraft to commercial (airlifters, tankers) and military customers (fighters, bombers, tankers) when 50% of service life is reached. The funds derived from this actvity will flow back into the budget (requiring a change in scoring law) thus recapitalizing it, and then used to place new orders.
Another core element of Trans-Recap calls for the slowing down of assembly lines rather than building the contracted AC as fast as possible. This allows upgrades in avionics and weapons systems to be incorporated while in production, thus precluding the necessity and costs of a complete retrofit 15 to 30 years later. This way, the service is always operating new or fully upgraded aircraft at all times, and when sold to NATO aillies at their half-life, will create new levels of operational readiness and interoperability.
http://www.dau.mil/documents/publications/dam/11_12_2004/rons-nd04.pdf
Overall, a nicely done piece Matthew, and please know that your balance and objectivity as both journalist and historian, is acknowledged.
Myron D. Stokes
Managing Member
Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC
Publisher
eMOTION! REPORTS.com
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