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Google Wooing Enterprise Market, Desperately Needs Users

By Erik Sherman | Jun 10, 2009

By releasing its new plug-in for Microsoft Outlook, Google has again signaled its interest in the business user market. It’s also a signal that the company is stuck and badly needs to embrace an old tech rule: It’s tough to make it in the productivity apps business if you only appeal to consumers. For Google, getting apps and services users is critical, because the company is hitting a market saturation point and needs new outlets to display ads.

No matter how much Google has pushed into other areas, something like 97 percent of its revenue is still from search, text, and display ads. It’s a great success, but limiting because of the way public companies must focus on growth to keep people interested in their stock, which, in turn, keeps the top executives wealthy. Google has an overwhelming market share, which is a competitive strength, but there are natural saturation points in markets. How much more can Google garner? Possibly more, but there’s a limit. Given the way the company has developed, that translates into a limit on its growth and ultimate size. Investors just don’t want to hear that. If the company wasn’t nervous, why would CEO Eric Schmidt spend time bashing Microsoft’s Bing? Because any potential threat to search is a threat to the company’s revenue security. It is too dependent, managing in comparison to make even Microsoft look as though it had a highly diverse set of income sources.

Getting beyond the restrictions of its current business model is everything to management there. I’ve argued, and would continue to do so, that Android is nothing more than a way to secure some of the mobile ad market, which Schmidt sees as critical to the company’s future. But as I pointed out yesterday, there is a lot of hype over how large mobile marketing will be.

Even if not at the saturation point yet, the company logically is approaching it, and mobile is uncertain. But Google’s business model must have ads. What it then needs to grow are other ways to deliver advertising. Apps and services become a clear and obvious mechanism.

The connection between consumer and corporate has been obvious to those in the business for any length of time. People tend to keep what they’re familiar with, and when you are given a certain set of applications in a corporation, those are the ones to which you tend to gravitate in your off hours. It’s like a reverse of the brilliant job that Apple, Adobe, and others have done in the past with educational discounts and versions of products. Get people used to one thing, and chances are that’s what they’ll buy when they’re out of school. In the case of a corporation, the audience is just as captured.

Google has been showing this desire for a foot in the corporation market for a while. Back in January, the company decided to use technology resellers to provide Google Apps to corporate customers. In its current pitch, Google puts things succinctly enough:

Now businesses can run Microsoft Outlook on Google Apps instead of Microsoft Exchange, so they can achieve the cost savings, security and reliability of Google Apps while employees use the interface they prefer for email, contacts and calendar.

Strip away the marketing and positioning for a moment, and you see a picture of what is going on. Google has developed a reputation for services that are anything but trustworthy, at least the way IT departments measure such things. They want predictability. If something goes wrong, they want to fix it immediately or, if a service, want the vendor available to hop on command. But Google isn’t set up to provide the level or type of service that corporations demand.

It also cannot get corporations to wholesale switch to new application interfaces because that requires training and change management, and there’s nothing in it for the businesses or their IT departments or users. This latest effort is just another way to try and make nice with enterprise users, all in hopes of finding new routes for ads. But, as my colleague Michael Hickins pointed out, when it comes to replacing Office, Microsoft is a crafty and contentious power. Although Google may badly need the users, getting them is going to require much more than a new Outlook plug-in. The company is going to need a new outlook on corporate IT and how much it needs to invest in infrastructure and support to succeed in wooing this market.

Image via stock.xchng user woodsy, site standard license.

Erik Sherman is a freelance journalist whose work has appeared in Newsweek, the New York Times Magazine, Technology Review, the Financial Times, Chief Executive, and other publications. Follow him on Twitter.

BNET User Analysis

Web Buzz:
  • Google makes an Outlook plugin to replace Exchange

    ZDNet - 167 days 4 hours 30 minutes ago

    So your organization uses Exchange currently? Your users are used to using Outlook to manage their mail, calendar and contacts, and they really like it. It’s simply not an option to tell your users to stop using a desktop client and embrace the web. Yesterday, Google announced a new plugin for Outlook that seamlessly integrates it with your...

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    CNET News - 160 days 11 hours 53 minutes ago

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  • Plug-in lets Outlook users synchronise with Google Apps

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    Google has developed a plug-in that enables Outlook users to synchronise their e-mail, calendar and contacts with Google Apps. Google Apps Sync for Microsoft Outlook supports Outlook 2003 and 2007. It provides access to Global Address List data and enables users to schedule meetings by looking up when attendees are free or busy, Google said. It...

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    ZDNet - 160 days 22 hours 29 minutes ago

    Installing the Google Apps Sync plug-in apparently prevents Outlook to search your email data. According to Microsoft’s Outlook blog, Google’s much ballyhooed effort to sync Apps and Outlook disables Windows Desktop Search, which indexes your email data and searches it. Well that could hurt. Microsoft says: There is a workaround if you’ve...

  • Google and Microsoft sitting in a tree...

    ReadWriteWeb - 168 days 13 hours 36 minutes ago

    "I think of this as a love story," began Chris Vander Mey, senior product manager at Google as he announced Google Apps Sync for Microsoft Outlook , a plug-in that syncs Outlook with Apps, much like Outlook syncs with Exchange. But love? Not so much. Google, intent on building its enterprise channel, has recognized that many Outlook users...

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  •  
    1

    Gary Edwards

    06/10/09 | Report as spam

    The Full Monty is Outlook MSOffice

    A few years ago Zimbra cracked into Outlook, and put
    themselves on the map as a credible alternative to both
    Exchange and Lotus Notes. Soon enough, Yahoo! swooped
    in to acquire Zimbra for $350 mil.

    The problem is that Outlook/Exchange is only part of the
    equation required to connect into the monopolists desktop
    stronghold. To compete with the Microsoft WebStack
    juggernaut, Zimbra also needs to crack into MSOffice, and
    the integrated MSOffice/SharePoint (MOSS) channel. This
    has yet to happen.

    The Zimbra approach is to re-purpose existing
    MSOffice productivity environments, connecting these
    desktops and workgroups to Zimbra Servers. It's a difficult
    challenge. But if it works, there's a good chance that
    Zimbra walks off with a fat slice of the monopolists server
    side opportunities.

    Microsoft of course has done everything they can to block
    server side competitors from cracking into the MSOffice
    productivity environment, (MSOffice suite, Access, and
    Outlook), and challenging the MS WebStack/Cloud/RiA
    juggernaut. The success of Microsoft's "rich client / rich
    server" strategy depends on blocking competitors from the
    kind of integrated access into the desktop productivity
    environment that provides the great monopolist with such an
    incredible advantage.

    This is also why Microsoft has fought so hard to defend their
    "rights" to provision existing MSOffice productivity
    environments with rich and feature filled, but proprietary and
    platform specific formats, protocols and interfaces. They
    also blocked the full implementation of Open Web formats,
    protocols and interfaces within these productivity environments exactly to frustrate competitors.

    This is a dangerous time for Microsoft because as they go
    about the business of re-purposing the MSOffice
    productivity environment to connect into their servers, the
    window of re-purposing is similarly open to others. Meaning,
    the methods, techniques and technologies Microsoft uses to
    re-purpose the desktop environment for the MS Server
    juggernaut, can also be used by competitors. With the re-
    purposing connectivity channel open, the focus becomes
    that of challengers being able to manipulate and fold
    proprietary formats, protocols and interfaces into Open Web
    alternatives (HTML+, HTTP, REST, etc.)

    A great transition is underway. Zimbra and Alfresco are
    representative of the handful of server side competitors to
    Microsoft that are running the re-purpose gauntlet. Others
    have chosen a different route. They are racing to
    replace the MSOffice desktop productivity
    environment before Microsoft can replace these competitors
    servers.

    Google, IBM, Novell, and Oracle are representative of
    competitors to Microsoft who seemingly have chosen the
    replacement route.

    IBM tires to replace MSOffice on the desktop with Lotus
    Symphony, promising Lotus Notes users better integration
    into the server side systems, at a cheaper price. They also
    trumpet the value of sovereign information that comes from
    the use of open standards at the format-protocol-interface
    level. The flip side of this strategy is that IBM is trying to
    protect their Lotus Notes servers from the MSOffice-
    Exchange/SharePoint/MOSS juggernaut.

    The battle lines are clear enough. Microsoft owns the
    desktop productivity environment. They will block every
    effort to integrate this environment into Lotus Notes
    Servers, offering instead a very compelling server side
    alternative: the Exchange/SharePoint/MOSS juggernaut.

    IBM owns the Lotus Notes - WebSphere server side empire,
    but they have been hemorrhaging marketshare for years.
    This should come as no surprise. After years of client/server
    information system development, the desktop is clearly the
    end-user interface into these information systems. In
    effect, Microsoft came to own and control the "client" in
    client/server. The trick for Microsoft today is to maintain
    their control over that "client", and the business systems
    bound to it, as the great transition to Web Server centric
    computing takes place.

    The replacement strategy is often called "rip out and
    replace" because of the costly and disruptive impact the
    strategy has on day to day business processes and
    workgroup tasks.

    Google faces a similar challenge. Rather than taking the re-
    purpose route, they too have chosen a replacement tact.
    And it's a race. The media tends to focus on Google's
    incredible server side dominance, while ignoring the battle
    over the desktop. At the desktop level, Google is trying to
    establish the browser as the OS for Open Web applications,
    services and communications. Microsoft is trying to re-
    purpose the MSOffice productivity environment to become
    the OS for MS Web applications, services and
    communications - an anchor if you will for the MS
    WebStack/Cloud/RiA systems.

    One of the more interesting aspects of this race is that of
    independent developer preferences. The Microsoft
    developer network is bound to the monopolist's platforms by
    far more than the investment and experience with .NET-WPF
    systems. They have years of "client/server" applications
    and services currently "in-process". Much of the direction
    this great transition takes will ride on their decisions.

    Microsoft, Zimbra and Alfresco will try to re-purpose the
    developer community bound to the MSOffice productivity environment in lock step with the re-purposing of the
    desktop applications themselves.

    Conversely, Google, IBM, Oracle and Novell will try to
    convince Microsoft bound developers to work with their
    desktop replacement alternatives.

    So all this is well and good. But the question remains. Who
    will win? And which strategy, replacement or re-purpose, is
    the better approach?

    The curtain call that took place at the March 2009 "World
    Mobility Conference", in Barcelona Spain, came as a shock to
    me. Up until that point, it looked to me like Microsoft was
    holding all the cards; that they had survived every anti-
    trust effort, protected the desktop monopoly, and were
    ready to leverage that monopoly into the emerging market of
    Web centric computing.

    Microsoft's desktop - server stuff really has become a
    juggernaut. They looked unstoppable except for one thing;
    they are lacking a device strategy capable of competing
    with that of the WebKit Community.

    Microsoft showed up at Barcelona empty handed. They
    didn't even have worthwhile powerpoints. Meanwhile, Apple
    ran away with the entire show, and they didn't show up.

    The importance of this is that, in losing the edge of the
    Web, where these WebKit communications and computing
    devices dominate, Microsoft has lost their bid to redefine the
    Web's document and application model with WPF proprietary
    stuff. Backed by Apple, Google, Nokia, Palm, and RiMM;
    then joined by Opera and Firefox, the WebKit HTML+
    document and application model is now sweeping across the
    greater Web.

    Yes the desktop is important. Especially to enterprise and
    organizational information systems where "value added" Web
    productivity trumps "disruptive rip-and-replace" approaches.
    But the Web is the platform of the future. It's the platform
    where desktop, devices and server side systems connect.

    While it's still a question to be answered, i'm betting that
    the Open Web will triumph over the MS Web. The surge at
    the edge of the Web is awesome and unstoppable. And, re-
    purposing works. It is possible to connect the MSOffice
    productivity environment to the Open Web, and do so
    without costly and disruptive initiatives.

    Hope this helps,
    ~ge~

  •  
    2

    Gary Edwards

    06/10/09 | Report as spam

    RE: Google Wooing Enterprise Market, Desperately Needs Users

    Whoops. Sorry about that. I left a tag open.


  •  
    3

    ErikSherman

    06/10/09 | Report as spam

    RE: Google Wooing Enterprise Market, Desperately Needs Users

    I would tend to agree with you, though it's easy to forget that the issue is not just one technology versus another, but user habits and IT department preferences. Users don't easily change what they're doing, though web-native apps have made great inroads. IT departments are concerned about price, staiblity of the vendor, existing infrastructure, support issues, security, and control. Those are powerful forces.

    Microsoft doesn't want to move to a platform that could easily be duplicated by others. I would also agree that if anything is going to work, it will be the repurpose strategy, as you phrase it. I think of it as replacing the back end but in such a way that it is compatible with the front end. However, then you have all the front end licensing the IT department still needs to do, and Microsoft has a lot of room for negotiation and bundling.

  •  
    4

    Gary Edwards

    06/12/09 | Report as spam

    User habits and IT preferences

    Hi Eric,

    Thanks for responding. I think that at one time, perhaps
    prior to the MSOffice 1997 release, user habits and IT
    preferences did indeed dominate decisions. Since then, the
    pendulum of decision making i think has swung to building on
    the infrastructure choices of the past rather than venturing
    out on a limb with choices that might offer better features in
    terms of security, stability, productivity advances, support,
    and Web connectivity, but would nevertheless have
    disruptive integration problems.

    The Massachusetts pilot study is a case in point. ODF at
    first glance seemed to offer everything Massachusetts
    wanted in a long term, open markup format. It seemed to fit
    the ERTM architecture perfectly: An open XML format
    designed to be application, platform and vendor
    independent, embracing other qualified open standards
    wherever needed, approved by ISO, and managed by an
    open consortia where the interests of application vendors,
    enterprise system providers, independent organizations,
    individual experts, end user gorups and open source
    communities were represented in with a balance favoring
    end users and open markets.

    The primary reason ODF failed in Massachusetts is that
    OpenOffice ODF was not designed to be compatible with the
    legacy of binary documents and applications. Meaning
    MSOffice and the dominant MSOffice productivity
    environment.

    There is a catch in the above statement that deserves
    notice. I said "OpenOffice ODF", not "ODF".

    The reason this is important is that OASIS ODF 1.0 did
    provide for compatibility extensions. The problem was that
    OpenOffice ODF did not support these extensions. This
    problem was further complicated by ISO "language" changes
    to the original ODF 1.0 specification that threw what little
    ODF interop there was for a loop.

    Compatibility with the MSOffice productivity environment
    was essential if ODF was to be successfully implemented.
    While it was entirely possible to provision MSOffice with an
    ODF plug-in designed for high level compatibility, there was
    no possibility of this MSOffice ODf being interoeprable with
    OpenOffice ODF. Unless of course, OpenOffice ODF was re-
    engineered to be compatible with MSOffice and the legacy
    of billions of binary documents bound to the MSOffice
    productivity environment.

    It's important to note something else here. Interoperability
    can be achieved at the application layer (within OpenOffice
    - MSOffice), or it can be achieved at the format
    specification layer.

    Interop at the application layer rests on the vendors coming
    to some sort of agreement. In the case of Microsoft and
    Sun, i believe that the 2004 billion dollar "interoperability
    Agreement" these companies signed could actually have
    been an agreement to limit interop between MSOffice and
    OpenOffice. It wouldn't be the first time that Microsoft was
    involved in a market splitting scheme, as this was the
    essence of their rel="nofollow" href="http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1900/1999.htm">pit
    ch to Netscape
    in 1995.

    Compatibility is the first requirement where ODf failed. And
    this was followed by interoperability problems that brought
    into question the entire premise that ODF was application
    independent, and that the OASIS ODF TC was balanced.
    Sun aggressively challenged the proposed changes to ODF
    designed to enhance compatibility, and instead pushed
    forward with an OpenOffice specific ODF requiring all other application to make accomodating changes. They also
    promised Massachusetts a Sun plug-in for MSOffice; which
    they did in fact deliver nearly a year later. Since the Sun
    plug-in was based on the OpenOffice conversion engine, the
    hoped for compatibility/interop was lacking. So much so
    that within hours after taking receipt of the Sun plug-in,
    Massachusetts announced that, going forward, they would
    now be supporting OOXML as well as ODF.

    At that point, ODF was done in Massachusetts.

    User habits and IT preferences had nothing to do with the
    failure of ODF in Massachusetts. ODF failed because
    Massachusetts couldn't find a way to implement it without
    seriously disrupting the day-to-day business processes and
    workgroup activities bound to existing MSOffice productivity
    environments.

    The results of the exhaustive Massachusetts pilot study
    were repeated in elsewhere; most notably by expert groups
    in California, Belgium and Denmark. (see, if you can, Sam
    Hiser's 300 page report, and the collaboration wiki that was
    used to collect the blow by blow details)

    Let me also point out that the Massachusetts pilot study
    also documents why it is that Linux desktops fail to make
    inroads with enterprises and businesses. It's the MSOffice
    "productivity environment" bound workgroups and business
    processes!

    For Google to succeed in the enterprise, they need to figure
    out how to integrate into the entire MSOffice productivity
    environment. Outlook is a good a start. But with the
    MSOffice editors they have to figure out how to get inside
    existing business processes without breaking the documents
    and workflows.

    It is here that Reuters Rule kicks in with a vengeance. RR
    simply states that conversion breaks documents in terms of
    both fidelity and embedded logic.

    Although end users tend to blame conversion "fidelity", the
    show stopper is actually the breakage of embedded logic.

    Having studied the Massachusetts pilot results, and
    conversed at length with primaries involved with California,
    Belgium and Denmark, i've come to the conclusion that end-
    user tend to register complaints having to do with what
    they "see" (fidelity), because they can't see the break
    damage internals of application specific setting, scripts,
    macros, OLE, data bindings, proprietary media and graphic
    components, security settings and environment components.

    If end-users are expressing their dissatisfaction in terms of
    fidelity, many would assume that it's all about user habits
    and IT preferences. But it's anything but.

    One aspect of the compatibility/interop issue arises; is it
    possible for competing applications to be designed for
    compatibility with MSOffice? The answer is yes, but this
    requires an understanding of the internal MSOffice layout
    engines, and how work with in-memory-binary-
    representations. This understanding must then be extended
    to the imbr conversion to RTF and OpenXML. It also means
    accepting/duplicating some pretty nasty design errors dating
    back tens of years.

    When it comes to "compatibility" with MSOffice, two
    applications deserve mention; Evermore Office and ThinkFree
    Office. They are designed for compatibility. Other applications like OpenOffice, KOffice and WordPerfect are
    designed to be competitive. They offer "features"
    comparable to those of MSOffice, but in packages designed
    for other purposes (i.e. Symphony is designed to connect to
    Lotus Notes - WebSphere servers, Novell Office is designed
    to connect to GroupWise and SAP systems).

    Scratch an ODF desktop office suite, and you'll almost
    always find specific server side solutions that sooner or later
    will find themselves competing directly with the Microsoft
    "rich client - rich server" juggernaut.

    There was a time when Google provided a free StarOffice
    ODF download. They have since discontinued that
    agreement with Sun, choosing instead to focus on the
    conversion of OpenXML to gDOCS, integration into Outlook,
    and building out their webkit based browser with advanced
    HTML+ "document and application" capabilities.

    Maybe they have finally got their hands on the 300 page
    Massachusetts Pilot Study Report? Too bad it's never been
    made public.

    ~ge~

  •  
    5

    ErikSherman

    06/12/09 | Report as spam

    RE: Google Wooing Enterprise Market, Desperately Needs Users

    >> For Google to succeed in the enterprise, they need to figure
    out how to integrate into the entire MSOffice productivity
    environment. <<

    That's only one hurdle. The far bigger one is to provide a dependable enough service and strong enough support to win the trust of IT and the C suite. And right now they simply don't have it and aren't close. Check the comment from COBRAws at http://www.bnet.com/5208-14060-0.html?forumID=1&threadID=13310&messageID=66144. Clearly there's at least one administrator that is frustrated with Google service. Ultimately, companies want services that are reliable so they can depend on being able to make money. It's not technology or capabilities so much as psychology. Google and many others that want to sell to enterprises don't seem to understand the people issues in play at the highest levels of management. Until they can satisfy those needs, they will continue to make little headway. Sure, anything that smacks of replacement has to be compatible with, or at least made accomodations for, the legacy of choices that companies have made. But that alone isn't going to be enough, nor is price. The newer companies must satisfy the concerns and calm the fears.

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